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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH .U 
JOSEPH L. MILLS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs, 
C. N. OTTOSEN, Commissioner 
of Insurance and the STATE OF 
UTAH, by and through its 
Insurance Department, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
Case No. 14496 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action involves the review of an Order of the 
Commissioner of Insurance suspending certain insurance licenses 
issued to plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff initiated this action to review an adminis-
trative Order of the Commissioner of Insurance suspending an 
insurance agent's and broker's license. On appeal to the 
District Court, the case was heard de novo pursuant to §31-4-9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
U.C.A. 1953. Upon hearing the evidence, the Court issued its 
Decision and Order directing that plaintiff1s licenses be 
reinstated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment of the 
Trial Court. Respondent seeks an order affirming that judg-
ment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants1 Statement of Facts is correct but 
incomplete. We shall restate the facts of the case to include 
uncontroverted evidence deemed to be pertinent to the Trial 
Court's decision. 
The transaction out of which the alleged violation 
arose was one in which Mr. Mills was requested by one Larry 
Bradshaw to secure a contractor's performance bond on a con-
struction project. Mr. Mills had done business with Mr. 
Bradshaw for a period of approximately 10 years. (R. 35.) The 
project in question was known as the Garden Square Project, 
a shopping center owned by one H. Shirl Wright and Commercial 
Enterprises, Inc. Wright and Commercial as ovmers had entered 
into a general construction contract with Riddco Company as 
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general contractor by the terms of which the latter agreed to 
construct the shopping center on a cost plus basis. (Exhibit 
1-D.) The construction money was provided by Valley Mortgage 
Company. Although the general contract did not require the 
contractor to provide a performance bond, the lender required 
such a bond as a condition to the interim financing. (R. 43.) 
Upon execution of the construction contract, Mr. Bradshaw, 
acting for the general contractor, Riddco, contacted Mr. Mills 
and asked that he obtain a corporate surety performance bond. 
(R. 45.) Financial statements on Riddco were provided for 
Mr. Mills1 use in securing the bond. Mr. Mills attempted to 
place this bond with several insurance companies (St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Insurance Company, Fidelity and Deposit Company 
of Maryland and Fireman's Fund). None of these companies 
would accept the risk because the project owner, Shirl Wright, 
was also a stockholder and principal of the contractor, Riddco. 
(R. 73, 74.) In the interim, while Mills was attempting to 
secure the performance bond of a corporate surety, Valley 
Mortgage disbursed two monthly construction draws but informed 
the contractor that it would make no further disbursement until 
a bond had been secured. (R. 45.) Bradshaw called Mills in 
September of 1975 and became angry with Mills because the 
latter had been unable to secure a bond. (R. 46.) Neither 
-1-
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Bradshaw nor Mills considered that there was any significant 
risk for a surety because of the common identity of the owner 
and contractor and the fact that it was a cost-plus job. 
(R. 44, 76.) It was at this time that Mr. Mills as an accom-
modation to Mr. Bradshaw agreed to sign the bond himself as 
surety if the lending institution was willing to accept his 
signature. (R. 47, 75.) Mills fully understood that he would 
be liable on the bond although he did not consider that there 
was any appreciable risk (R. 76) and Bradshaw knew that there 
were no resources behind the signature of Mills as surety 
except for his personal resources. (R. 47.) No one has ever 
claimed that any one was misled into believing that an insur-
ance company was on the risk as surety. (See R. 47, 56.) 
It was simply a question of whether the bank was willing to 
accept Mills1 personal guarantee of the obligation. The 
bank received the bond and was aware from the outset that 
Mills or his personal company (Mills, Gundry & Associates) was 
the surety on the obligation and that no insurance company 
was obligated by the bond. (R. 56.) The bank was unwilling 
to accept the personal bond of Mills and that bond was, there-
fore, rejected. Neither the bank nor the contractor were 
ever able to secure a bond and the bank later waived its re-
quirement for a performance bond. (R. 57.) 
-4-
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Mills testified that the signing of the bond was 
an extraordinary transaction for him; that he was not in the 
business of signing bonds; that he agreed to provide the 
bond with the understanding that the bank would accept his 
personal guarantee; that he agreed to perform this service 
as an accommodation and without any remuneration to him and 
that he did not bill and was never paid any sum of money or 
other consideration for his accommodation. (R. 78, 79.) 
The matter came before the Insurance Commission 
when a representative of the bank delivered the bond to the 
Insurance Commissioner. As a result of that, an investiga-
tion was undertaken and the Insurance Commissioner concluded 
that there had been a violation of the insurance lax^ s and 
that Mr. Mills' licenses as an insurance agent should be 
suspended. An Order to that effect was entered October 28, 
1975. The case was duly appealed to the District Court. 
At the time of the Suspension Order Mr. Mills was 
49 years of age and had been engaged in the insurance business 
for over 20 years. (R. 71.) Mr. Mills was married with four 
children. He was doing business through a small company 
owned by two families, Mills-Gundry & Associates, Inc. The 
Insurance Commissioner forwarded notice of the Suspension 
Order to the various companies which Mr. Mills represented and 
-5-
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these companies suspended their licenses with Mills and "told 
him to get out of business11. (R. 80.) Mr. Mills was thereby 
forced to negotiate the sale of his share of the insurance 
business to his partner, Mr. Gundry. He estimates that the 
forced sale of his interest in the business brought about an 
economic loss of $100,000.00. (R. 81.) To his further injury 
he was out of business overnight and forced into another 
occupation in order to earn a livelihood. His income was 
abruptly reduced from approximately $2,000.00 per month to 
less than $1,000.00 per month. (R. 80-81.) In addition to 
the economic loss, the suspension of his professional licenses 
brought public embarrassment and humiliation particularly in 
light of civic and church positions which he held at the time 
of the Order. (R. 82.) 
The findings of the Trial Court indicate some doubt 
in the mind of the Court as to whether there had been a viola-
tion of the Insurance Code. The Court made no specific finding 
or conclusion either that there was or was not a violation. 
(R. 15-16.) There was a specific finding, however, that even 
assuming a violation, the continued suspension of the licenses 
would be disproportionate to any offense that might have 
occurred and the Court directed reinstatement of these licenses. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT VIOLATE THE INSURANCE CODE 
Plaintiff's counsel has some difficulty in determining 
from the arguments advanced at the District Court hearing and 
in the appellants1 brief exactly what violations of the Insur-
ance Code are claimed to have occurred in this case. Various 
sections of the Code are quoted in appellants' Statement of 
the Law (Pages 5-7, Appellants1 Brief) but appellants1 argument 
does not relate the facts of the case to the abstract statements 
of law which are quoted. The Commission's Suspension Order of 
October 28, 1975, refers only to §§31-17-50(b)(h)(i) and 31-27-6, 
U.C.A. 1953. (R. 4-5.) These sections are discussed in the 
following pages of this brief. 
Appellants' argument generally proceeds upon the state-
ments that Mills was guilty of "pawning a $1,000,000.00 phony 
bond...as a surety bond" and that he violated some duty (not 
defined by appellants) which was owed to the lending institution 
in resolving a "conflict in his favor" by executing the bond, 
thereby creating an "exposure to the bank". (Page 8, Appellants' 
Brief.) 
We find no violation of any provisions of the Insurance 
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Code in the transaction here involved. The performance bond 
executed by Mr. Mills is just as enforceable by the obligee 
as it would have been had a corporate surety executed the obliga-
tion. This was not a l!phonyM bond. Mr. Mills1 guarantee as 
a surety was certainly not as valuable a guarantee as that of 
a qualified insurer but everyone understood that the obligation 
did not require any insurance company to respond and was backed 
only by the resources of Mills (and/or his personal company). 
The signing of the bond was expressly predicated upon the 
assumption that it should have no effect unless the bank was 
willing to accept Mills as surety. (R. 47, 75.) The bank was 
not misled. They knew that Mills (or his company) was the only 
obligor and were never led to believe that there was any insur-
ance carrier behind the obligation. (R. 56.) 
We find no provision in the Insurance Code which makes 
it unlawful for an individual to become an obligor on a surety-
type obligation. As the Court knows, it is common practice for 
individuals not qualified as insurers to execute bonds as 
sureties (i.e., attachment and garnishment bonds, etc.). As 
might be expected, the proscription of the Insurance Code is 
that no person may engage as an "insurer11 without compliance 
with the requirements of the insurance laws. (§31-5-2, U.C.A. 
1953.) An "insurer" is defined as follows (§31-1-10, U.C.A., 
1953): 
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11
 'Insurer1 includes every person engaged as 
indemnitor, surety, or contractor in the 
business of entering into contracts of 
insurance or annuity..." (Emphasis added.) 
There is no argument nor is there any evidence in 
this case that Mills has engaged "in the business of entering 
into contracts of insurance." His signing of the bond in this 
instance was without any expectation of compensation and was 
an isolated and extraordinary occurrence which was not a part 
of his ordinary business. The term "business" is generally 
considered to be an activity, occupation or employment regularly 
engaged in as a livelihood or for profit [see Cases Collected 
5A Words & Phrases, Pages 596, et seq.] These elements are 
not present in this transaction any more than they would have 
been had a doctor or lawyer executed the bond under the same 
circumstances. 
In answer to the appellants1 argument that some duty 
was owed to the bank and that the bank was unreasonably sub-
jected to a risk, we simply respond that there is no evidence 
whatever of any deception or attempt to deceive on the part of 
Mills. Mills stated from the outset that the bank must be 
willing to accept his personal guarantee. (R. 47, 75.) The 
witness from the bank testified that he was not misled and 
that he knew there was no insurance company on the bond. (R. 56 
-9-
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The Commissioner's Suspension Order of October 28, 
1976, cites §§31-17-50(b)(h)(i) and 31-27-6 as the sections 
of the Code allegedly violated by Mr. Mills. Section 31-27-6, 
U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
MNo person who is not an insurer shall 
assume or use any name which deceptively 
infers or suggests that it is an insurer.11 
Although this statute is cited, no argument is made that the 
facts of the transaction are pertinent to the citation. 
Neither the name "Joseph L. Mills11 nor "Mills, Gundry & 
Associates" deceptively infers that the user "is an insurer". 
The Commissioner of Insurance has heretofore licensed "Joseph 
L. Mills" as an agent and has licensed "Mills, Gundry & 
Associates" as a broker without any exception to the use of 
those names. 
Section 31-17-50(b)(h) and (i), U.C.A. 1953 provides 
that the Commissioner may suspend or revoke licenses if the 
licensee willfully violates any provision of the Insurance 
Code (Sub-Section (b)) or "has shown himself..."incompetent or 
untrustworthy, a source of injury and loss to the public" 
(Sub-Section (h)) or deals with insurance outside the scope 
of his licenses (Sub-Section (i)). As heretofore noted, there 
was no violation of the Insurance Code. The conduct of the 
plaintiff in this instance was certainly not evidence of "incom-
petency," did not disclose that he was "untrustworthy" and did 
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not show that there was any "injury and loss to the public". 
In signing the performance bond, he did only what he had a 
right to do and there was no element of bad faith, concealment, 
non-disclosure or attempt to deceive. Finally, there was no 
"dealing" [selling] of any type of insurance outside the scope 
of the licenses. In signing the bond, Mills was not acting 
as a commissioned salesman of insurance. 
We see no evidence in the transaction of any violation 
of the provisions of the Insurance Code or of any conduct on 
the part of Mr. Mills which justifies the suspension of his 
insurance licenses. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT PLAINTIFF VIOLATED 
THE INSURANCE CODE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THE CASE ARE SUCH AS TO WARRANT THE TRIAL 
COURT!S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION TO REIN-
STATE THE PLAINTIFFfS LICENSES. 
Even assuming that Mr. Mills was found to be "guilty 
of violation of the law", the District Court is granted dis-
cretion to require reinstatement of the agent's and broker's 
licenses "if it deems the suspension or revocation too severe 
a penalty under the facts as found." (§31-4-14, U.C.A. 1953.) 
That is exactly what the Court did in this instance. Mills 
acted in good faith and with a desire to accommodate a friend 
-11-
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and client and without profit to himself. The extreme to 
which the Commissioner went in this case is illustrated in 
part by the fact that he suspended the licenses for a period 
of 18 months (R. 4-5) even though he only had statutory ?i 'j "rs!* 
authority to suspend for 12 months. (§31-17-51, U.C.A. 
1953.) The Suspension Order had the effect of destroying a -
professional reputation and a business built over a period 
of more than 20 years. The fact that the Commissioner 
challenges the Court's discretion to grant relief under these 
circumstances is evidence of his totally unreasonable attitude 
toward Mr. Mills and his inability to view the situation with 
objectivity and basic fairness. The statutory discretion of 
the Court was properly exercised. 
CONCLUSION •-''•" * 
It is respectfully submitted that there was no viola-
tion of the Insurance Code and that even assuming a violation, 
the facts fully warrant the District Court's finding that: con-
tinued suspension of the licenses was !ltoo severe a penalty11. 
The judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submit^p^H' LtirsvJrd day of September, 1976, 
VAN COTT, ikAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCAKBHY 
Gra^^l^a7?^rTane, Jtlv. ^ 
Atto^Aeys for Plaintiff-\ 
Res^pndent N^^) 
141 East First South ^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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